How to get through — Arsenal vs Liverpool

Samuel AP
7 min readApr 11, 2024

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Liverpool vs Arsenal — Sequence Analysis

On the 4th of February Liverpool travelled to London to face Arteta’s Gunners, it was a fascinating tactical battle which saw Arsenal prevail deservedly as the winners in a 3–1 victory, Liverpool came up against numerous tactical questions that they struggled to answer convincingly during the game. Arsenal’s high press was dynamic, intense and most importantly stopped Liverpool’s players from turning and facing the goal-side, Liverpool’s midfielders often found themselves playing back to goal. However, in this short piece of writing I will be focusing on a specific passage of play in which Liverpool were able to provide a correct answer to a question Arsenal posed during the game.

From the start of passage of play we can see the move started from a goal-kick, this type of context means that Arsenal will be usually be ready to disrupt their opposition’s buildup, Arsenal ensure they have push their block as high as possible to not cede any territory and to ensure they can control the game out of possession as far away as possible from their goal. This then leads into the employment of a man to man system in which they to seek to pressure the opposition’s build-up unit to stop any individual/collective advantages being generated (1v1 manipulation, 1–2s, third man combinations, passes in behind because no pressure on ball-carrier and so forth).

Below is an image that that depicts the collective and individual structures of both teams at the time of the goal kick. Speaking about Arsenal specifically they have transitioned from their usual 4–4–2/4–1–4–1 zonal structure and are now trying to aggressively engage Liverpool in their M2M structure:

· 1st line of pressure — Havertz on Konate also tasked with pressing Alisson where appropriate whilst blocking the passing lane into Konate, Odegaard on VVD, Saka on Gomez and Martinelli monitoring Trent.

· 2nd line of pressure — Jorginho on Jones and MacAllister, Rice is focused on Jota, whilst Zinchenko has stepped up his position and is man-marking Gravernberch.

Last line of pressure — Arsenal have a numerical advantage here, as Jota decided drop deeper, leaving Diaz and Gakpo to be looked after by Arsenal’s back 3.

In an ideal situation Arsenal would very much prefer if Liverpool played the ball into the wide areas or to go long. Going into the wide areas early without novel solutions allowed Arsenal to horizontally shift their block and collapse onto the ball and restrict Liverpool from playing out from that position. The help of the touchline and the closeness of Arsenal’s players would most likely force Liverpool to go over their press, considering the profile of Liverpool’s attack compared to the height and power of Arsenal’s backline this method of ball progression would’ve been sub-optimal. Below is a illustration, Arsenal have achieved numerical parity (4v4) on the right side of the pitch and with the help of the touchline have caged Liverpool in. Saka was also often tasked with providing horizontal compactness by tucking in and covering the 2nd pivot (Jones) in case Liverpool were able circulate the ball horizontally out of this wide pressing trap.

Now that we have established that going into the wide area’s early was a sub-optimal approach from Liverpool as Arsenal could easily box them in and win the ball high up, the question then becomes what other spaces on the pitch can be exploited in order to bypass Arsenal’s wide pressing trap? Going long also isn’t optimal as I highlighted above the profiles in Liverpool’s frontline combined with the height and physicality of Arsenal’s backline meant that wasn’t a viable option. It seems all roads point to the centre. Central progression was highlighted by myself in my last writing as something that is paramount in allowing the ball to reach the final third in a more optimal manner so lets get into it, How did Liverpool do it in this instance?

The positioning of Van Djik is what starts the sequence of in an optimal manner for Liverpool. Van Djik has positioned himself lower, closer to Alisson and this in turn means Odegaard must jump and press which subsequently leaves Curtis Jones free from his cover shadow. The distances between Arsenal’s line of pressure have increased thus leaving more space for Liverpool’s buildup unit to favourably operate in. Liverpool’s using Alisson as the extra player proves to be invaluable as he able to introduce an overload and make it a 3v2 in this specific situation. Van Dijk’s body language and orientation is languid and he is faced towards Alisson and helps to calm any suspicions about a pass directly into Liverpool’s pivot. However, this turns out to be the case and via a third man combination Alisson is able to fire a first time ball into their 2nd line, into Jones. Jones is afforded enough time and space on the ball due to Jota’s positioning.

As it can be seen above Jota has dropped into midfield to introduce another overload, Jota dropping into midfield means Rice must be cautious and stay close to him, which stops him from supporting Jorginho who has been left to deal with a 2v1 overload due to Jota’s pinning. Jorginho being left in a 2v1 situation with MacAllister and Jones is clearly a disadvantage for Arsenal in this phase of play and Liverpool are able to exploit this, Jones is able to complete a little dribble which has one major effect: enticing Arsenal’s block to collapse onto the ball thus squeezing the space in the centre but subsequently creating space out wide.

Here we can see how much Jones’ dribble has meant Arsenal’s are now in reactive mode and are calling in their troops to ensure central compactness, Martinelli’s positioning here is most interesting as he decides to leave Trent alone and help block the centre. Gravernberch positioning delights me as he further indents infield to drag Zinchenko away from his position to allow even more space for Trent to arrive into.

However this leaves space out wide for Trent and Konate to exploit, which they then go on to exploit to great avail.

Now as the live image below shows, the space has been created, Martinelli has been forced inside to provide central compactness, Trent and Konate have been left alone temporarily to have some fun.

Konate goes on to receive the ball and plays a pass with lots of technical empathy into the space in front of Trent, this is especially important because it allows Trent to spend less time controlling the ball and more time thinking about what to do with it, the pass in short speeds up the tempo of this particular attack thus making it harder for Arsenal to react and defend the space adequately.

Trent is able to whip the cross in under minimal pressure, which due Gabriel’s excellent positioning is able to be stopped before Gakpo can arrive on the scene.

Final deductions

To summarise up this reading in the most succinct way possible I want to draw to attention some of the most important features on the passage of play:

· Positioning: The positioning of Liverpool’s buildup unit was especially important in attracting Arsenal’s player closer to the ball, stretching the lines of pressure (distances between and thus making it easier for ball progression and retention in centre.

· Body language and body orientation: This individual tactic served as a good basis for deceiving Arsenal’s players to make their induvial actions easier to execute.

· Pinning & Overloads: In order to eliminate players from Arsenal’s pressing unit maintaining an numerical overload is of paramount importance in this sequence, Jota dropping deep essentially eliminates Rice and allows Liverpool to maintain the 2v1 (Jones & MacAllister vs Jorginho) in the centre.

· Dribbling to attract players and create space: Curtis Jones is allowed to turn and dribble in the centre for a few seconds, this attracts Arsenal’s players towards the ball and most importantly attracts Martinelli towards the centre (he does this maintain horizontal compactness — reducing the horizontal distance between the players within the block) which frees up space for Trent

· Technical empathy: The pass from Konate is mint, the ball is passed into Trent’s path not behind him or directly to feet. This indirectly speeds up the tempo of the attack because it allows Trent to go on to complete his next action without having to take a touch.

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Samuel AP
Samuel AP

Written by Samuel AP

Somewhere between excess and deficiency.

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